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I.
A.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Nature of the Case.
This is an appeal from a grant of summary judgment entered by the District Court

on July 6 , 2007, dismissing the negligence claiins brought by plaintiffs Ray Harrison ("plaintiff'
or "Mr. Harrison") and Julie Anderson1against D. Lee Binnion, M.D. ("defendant" or
"Dr. Binnion"), and the District Court's subsequent Order Granting in Part and Denying in Part
Plaintiffs' Motion for Reconsideration, entered September 27, 2007. The District Court ruled on
summary judgment that there was insufficient evidence that the emergency medical care
provided by Dr. Binnion caused any injury to Mr. Harrison, and that there was no chain of
circumstances from which such a causal nexus could be inferred. R. Val. 11, p. 299. In addition,
the District Court concluded that plaintiffs expert's opinion on the issue of causation was
speculative. R., Val. 11, p. 299. Following plaintiffs Motion for Reconsideration, which was
heard on September 20,2007, the District Court stood by its earlier order, concluding that there
had not been "an adequate evidentiary showing that Dr. Biimion's alleged conduct caused any
damages." R., Vol. 11, p. 31 1. Accordingly, the District Court held that the prior order granting
summary judgment would remain undisturbed, and the plaintiffs claims against Dr. Binnion
would be dismissed as a matter of law.

At the time their Complaint was filed, Mr. Hamson and Ms. Anderson claimed to be
married at common law. The two were formally married after commencement of this lawsuit.
The sole appellant in this matter, however, is Mr. Harrison, as Mrs. Harrison did not join in the
Notice of Appeal filed October 30,2007 (R., Val. 11, p. 313). Although the Complaint was
prosecuted by both Mr. and Mrs. Harrison, for purposes of continuity herein, all subsequent
references in Respondent's Brief will refer to plaintiff Ray Harrison in the singular.

B.

Course of the Proceedings.

Plaintiff filed his original Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial on April 28,
2004. R., Vol. I, p. 22. Following a lengthy discovery process, plaintiff sought leave to file his
First Amended Complaint on November 15,2005. R., Vol. 1, p. 116. The scope of the requested
amendment was subsequently expanded, and plaintiff sought to add a claim for punitive damages
against both St. Alphonsus Regional Medical Center ("SARMC") and Jeffrey Hartford, M.D., in
addition to his motion to add a claim for negligent credeiltialing against SARMC. On May 18,
2006, the District Court issued its decision denying the motion as against SARMC and granting
leave to request punitive damages against Dr. Hartford. R., Val. I, p. 183. Dr. Hartford entered
into a settlement agreement shortly thereafter with plaintiff and was dismissed from the case. R.,
Val. 11, p. 249. Litigation continued between plaintiff and defendants Dr. Binnion and SARMC.
Upon completing discovery, including the depositions of plaintiffs designated
expert witnesses, Dr. Binnion filed a Motion for Sumnary Jud,ment seeking dismissal of
plaintiffs claims. R., Vol. 11, p. 264. The motion was opposed, and following oral argument,
the District Court entered its Order Granting Summary Judgment to D. Lee Binnion on July 6,
2007 (see R., Voi. 11, p. 280), on multiple grounds: first, that plaintiff had failed to establish the
necessary foundation for the opinion testimony of his standard of care expert, Dr. Paul Navar;
and secondly, that there was no admissible evidence that any alleged breach of the local standard
of care caused Mr. Harrison's injuries. R., Vol. 11, p. 294.
Plaintiff moved the District Court for reconsideration on July 26, 2007. R.,
Val. 11, p. 301. The Motion for Reconsideration was heard on September 20,2007, and one

week later the District Court issued its Order Granting in Part and Denying in Part Plaintiffs'
Motion for Reconsideration. R., Vol. 11, p. 310. While the District Court granted
reconsideration of its earlier order excluding plaintiffs expert, Paul Navar, M.D., from
testifying, the court nevertheless denied reconsideration of its decision granting summary
judgment on the issue of causation. R., Vol. 11, p. 31 1. Accordingly, Judgment was entered in
favor of both Dr. Binnion and SARMC on September 27,2007 (R., Vol. 11, p. 307), and the
plaintiffs Notice of Appeal was filed on October 30,2007. R., Vol. 11, p. 3 13.
C.

Statement of Facts.

The underlying facts of this case have been undisputed with virtually no
exception. In her Order Granting Summary Judgment to D. Lee Binnion, Judge Copsey set forth
an accurate summary of the undisputed facts that had been presented by the parties in the
materials supporting and opposing summary judgment. See R., Vol. 11, p. 281, L. 21 - p. 284,

L. 17. Because the referenced summary of facts by Judge Copsey was taken from the materials
submitted by the parties in prior proceedings before the District Court, and because the following
facts as summarized by Judge Copsey have been undisputed-both

below and now on appeal-

they are set forth in pertinent part herein for convenience to the Court.
Mr. Harrison sought treatment from his wife's physician, Dr. Minas, on
November 14,2003, at approximately 3:00 p.m. R., Vol. 11, p. 281. Blood was drawn and a
physical examination conducted, and Dr. Minas recommended that Mr. I-Iarrison seek treatment
at the emergency room. Id. Mr. Harrison nevertheless returned to his home against the advice of
Dr. Minas, following which Dr. Minas received the results of the blood panels drawn earlier that

afternoon, revealing that Mr. Harrison's serum sodium level was extremely low: 1i 1
milliequivalentslliter (mEq1L.). Id. Dr. Minas then contacted Mr. Harrison and told him to go to
the hospital emergency rooin for further treatment. Id., p. 282.
Mr. Harrison presented at the SARMC Emergency Department at approximately
11:35 p.m. on November 14, 2003, with symptoms of vomiting, diarrhea, imbalance, dizziness
and speech impairment. R., Val. 11, p. 326, Exhibit 17 (Affidavit of Eric S. Rossman in Support
of Plaintiffs' Motions to Amend for Punitive Damages), Exhibit 1 (SARMC medical records),
Bates Nos. 000561,000564. According to Mr. Harrison's family, he had been going "downhill"
for the preceding seven weeks, with "episodes of vomiting and diarrhea three or four times a
day." Id., Bates No. 000561. According to the history provided by Mrs. Harrison to the
SARMC Emergency Department, Mr. Hamson's condition had significantly deteriorated:
It has gotten to the point where he has gotten so weak over the past
three to four days that he stumbles and reels when he tries to stand
up. He looks like he is staggering. He is increasingly lightheaded
every time he stands up, although he has not had any syncopal
episodes, and for the past three days according to hk wife, he has
not had anything to eat or drink outside of alcohol. It got so severe
that she finally convinced him to go see Dr. Minas today, who saw
him in the office and told him that his electrolytes were out of
balance, sent him home, but then called back a couple of hours
later and said that he needed to come in and be admitted.

When Mr. Hamson presented to the Emergency Department, the nurses
immediately drew blood for necessary chemistry panels. Id., Bates No. 000563,000565.
According to the Emergency Department records, Dr. Binnion began her care and
treatment of Mr. Harrison at 12:49 a.m. on November 5,2003. Id., Bates No. 000568. The

blood chemistry panels revealed that Mr. Harrison's serum sodium had decreased further, from
111 mEq./L at 3:00 p.m. on November 14, to 96 mEqIL. by shortly after midnight on
November 15. Id., Bates Nos. 000234,000561-000568. Dr. Binnion ordered administration of
normal saline, noting specifically in the chart that "I think that his sodium has taken quite some
time to get this low, and I do not want to replace it too quickly as that could cause cerebral
edema." Id., Bates No. 000562. Dr. Binnion then ordered a "them.-7" blood panel to be
performed every six hours in order to monitor Mr. Harrison's sodium replacement. See id.
Dr. Bimion saw Mr. Harrison again in the emergency department at
approximately 2:35 a.m. on November 15. Id., Bates No. 000568. By that time, Mr. Harrison's
vital signs were within normal ranges. See id., Bates No. 000566. Dr. Bimion spoke with
Dr. Hartford, who was the physician on call for Mr. Harrison's treating physician, Dr. Minas,
and recommended that Harrison be admitted to SARMC. R., Vol. 11, p. 327, Exhibit 25
(Affidavit of Patricia M. Olsson in Support of D. Lee Binnion, M.D.'s Motion for Partial
Summary Judgment Re: Negligence Claims), Exhibit C (Deposition of D. Lee Bimion, M.D.),
p. 104, LL. 13-21. There is no dispute that Dr. Binnion, as an emergency department physician,
did not have admitting privileges at SARMC. R., Vol. 11, p. 282. In fact, plaintiffs own
emergency physician expert testified that as an emergency room physician he does not have
admitting privileges, and that traditionally an emergencypkysician's responsibility ends when
the patient is admitted by a treating physician. R., Vol. 11, p. 327, Exhibit 25, Exhibit A
(Deposition Transcript of Paul Navar, M.D.), p. 23, LL. 1-16. As a result, it was necessary for

Dr. Binnion to consult with the treating physician, obtain his order for admission, and then
prepare that order for the treating physician.
Dr. Hartford agreed that Mr. Harrison should be admitted, and Dr. Binnion
initially suggested that Mr. Harrison be admitted to the telemetry floor, noting that because
Mr. Harrison "really looked pretty good" considering his condition, he would be alright "on the
floor with the general medical treatment." R., Val. 11, p. 327, Exhibit 25, Exhibit C, p. 111,
LL. 8-17. Dr. Hartford recommended against admission to the telemetry floor because, in his
opinion, the telemetry floor presented risks of overstimulus given Mr. Harrison's detoxification
from alcohol. Id., p. 111, LL. 18-25. Once it was decided that Mr. Harrison should be admitted
to the medical floor, Dr. Binnion specifically informed Dr. Hartford of the need for continued
sodium replacement at 200 CCs per hour normal saline, and that chemical labs were being taken
every six hours, which would need monitoring on a regular basis. See id., p. 112, L. 1 - p. 113,
L. 1.
Mr. Harrison was admitted to SARMC at 3:26 a.m. on November 15, 2003. R.,
Val. 11, P. 326, Exhibit 17, Exhibit 1, Bates Nos. 000567-000568. Upon Mr. Harrison's
admission to SARMC, and according to plaintiffs' own expert, Dr. Binnion's responsibility for
the care and treatment of Mr. Harrison then transferred to Dr. Hartford. R., Val. 11, p. 327,
Exhibit A, p. 23, LL. 1-16.

11.

ISSUE PRESENTED ON APPEAL

Whether the District Court correctly determined that plaintiff failed to

I.

present admissible evidence that, to a reasonable degree of medical certainty, Dr. Binnion caused
Harrison's CPM.
111.
1.

ADDITIONAL ISSUE PRESENTED ON APPEAL
Dr. Binnion is entitled to an award of attorney fees on appeal.
IV.

ARGUMENT

The District Court properly granted summary judgment in favor of Dr. Binnion.
On this appeal, plaintiff attempts to distract the Court with irrelevant issues and facts, coupled
with emotional language and argument. However, the Court will surely focus on the important
issues and applicable argument; namely, that plaintiffs expert testified that he could not say to a
reasonable degree of medical certainty that Dr. Binnion caused Mr. Harrison's injuries, and that
therefore, Dr. Binnion was entitled to summary judgment.

A.

Standard of Review.
Upon review of an order of the District Court granting summary judgment, the

standard of review is the same standard used by the District Court in ruling on the motion.

Watson v. Weick, 141 Idaho 500,504, 112 P.3d 788,792 (2005). Summary judgment is
appropriate when "the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file, together with the
affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party
is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." IDAHO R. CIV. P. 56(c). If there is no genuine issue

of material fact, "only a question of law remains, over which this Court exercises free review."
Watson, 141 Idaho at 504.
In addition, a "nonmoving party's failure to make a showing sufficient to
establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, on which that party will bear
the burden of proof at trial, requires the entry of summary judgment." Jarman v. f i l e , 122
Idaho 952,955-56,842 P.2d 288,291-92 (Ct. App. 1992). The nonmoving party is further
required to set forth specific facts, by affidavit of otherwise (and not mere conclusions), from
admissible record evidence, in order to show a genuine issue of material fact. See Verbillis v.
Dependable Appliance Co., 107 Idaho 335,337,689 P.2d 227,229 (Ct. App. 1984).
B.

The District Court Was Correct in Granting Summary Judgment Since
Plaintiff Failed To Present Admissible Evidence that Dr. Binnion's Care and
Treatment of Ray Harrison Caused the Alleged Injury.
Plaintiff argues on appeal that the District Court erred in granting summary

judgment to Dr. Birmion (Appellant's Brief, p. 8), insisting that the testimony of his standard of
care expert, Dr. Navar, establishes a genuine issue of material fact whether Dr. Binnion's alleged
breaches of the local standard of care "were a substantial factor in causing the condition of
Central Pontine Myelinolysis ("CPM") in Mr. Harrisonn (id., p. 46). Dr. Binnion is alleged to
have breached the local standard of care by: (a) failing to slow the rate of sodium replacement;
(b) failing to communicate within her physician's orders her concerns about rapid sodium
elevation and that all lab values be immediately reported to the attending physician; and
(c) failing to ensure that Mr. Harrison was admitted to the Intensive Care Unit. See id., pp. 46,
50,51. These precise arguments were presented to the District Court and each was denied as a

matter of law. Even assuming for purposes of summary judgment that Dr. Navar's testimony
concerning the alleged breaches of the local standard of care was correct, neither he nor
plaintiffs causation expert, Dr. Robert Laureno, were able to testify to a reasonable degree of
medical certainty that such breaches caused Mr. Harrison to develop CPM. Given plaintiffs
failure to establish the essential element of causation, entry of summary judgment was not only
proper, but required
1.

Given the complexity of the medical issues in this case, admissible
expert testimony establishing causation is required.

The District Court originally granted Dr. Binnion's Motion for Summary
Judgment on the grounds that plaintiff had "failed to produce admissible expert evidence that, to
a reasonable degree of medical certainty, Dr. Binnion caused Harrison's CPM. . . ." and because
"there was no chain of circumstances from which causation reasonably could be inferred." R.,
Vol. 11, pp. 297,299. Summary judgment had also been granted because plaintiff had failed to
establish the necessary foundation for the opinion testimony of Dr. Paul Navar. On plaintiffs
Motion for Reconsideration, the District Court reversed its earlier decision on whether there was
a sufficient foundation for Dr. Navar's opinions and reserved that issue for the time of trial. R.,
Vol. 11,p. 31 1. However, the District Court left in place its earlier grant of summary judgment
because, even assuming that plaintiff had demonstrated evidence of a breach of the local
standard of care, he nevertheless failed to provide expert witness testimony establishing that the
alleged breach, i.e., Dr. Binnion's actions that raised Mr. Harrison's sodium level from 96
mEq./L at 12:49 a.m. to 105 mEq./L at 6:00 a.m., was in itself sufficient to cause the resulting
CPM. Given Mr. Harrison's life-threatening hyponatremia, the treatment of which is

complicated enough without the added factor of plaintiffs alcohol toxicity and corresponding
risk of seizures, and the eventual developmellt of central pontine myelinolysis, this case is
complicated both factually and medically, and expert witness testimony is necessary in order to
establish the central element of causation.
It is well-settled under Idaho law that, the more complicated the case, the more
likely expert testimony on causation will be required. This rule holds particularly true in cases of
alleged medical malpractice. In Swallow v. Emergency Medicine of Idaho, P.A., 138 Idaho 589,
67 P.3d 68 (2003), this Court clarified its earlier ruling in Sheridan v. St. Luke's Regional

Medical Center, 135 Idaho 775,25 P.3d 88 (2001), which had stated in dicta that expert
testimony regarding causation in a medical malpractice case was not required.' The Swallow
court was very deliberate in distinguishing the Sheridan case, noting that when it issued the
earlier decision, it
did not hold that expert testimony is never necessary in order to
prove causation in a medical malpractice case. We simply held
that expert testimony that the nurses' negligence was a proximate
cause of the child's injuries was not required under thefacts of
that particular case.

Id. (emphasis added). Thus, this Court expressly limited the Sheridan holding.

* The Sheridan case concerned a newborn who went untreated for jaundice, and his
hyperbilirubinaeinia eventually led to cerebral palsy. In that case, there was a direct chain
formed, linking the nurses' negligence, the child's untreated jaundice (which was untreated for
various reasons) and his development of cerebral palsy. Specifically, the nurses did not notify
the child's pediatrician during the first 24 hours of life that the child was jaundiced, nor that
bilirubin tests had not been conducted; did not chart indicia that could have been used to trace
the jaundice's progress, and did not note the possible blood incompatibility between mother and
child. Moreover, nursing staff failed to warn the child's parents, upon discharge, that the
jaundice he had might not be normal.

There is ample precedent, however, supporting the proposition that expert medical
testimony on causation is necessary in the clear majority of cases of alleged medical malpractice.
For example, the Swallow court reviewed several prior decisions where this Court held that lay
people (and by way of extension, jurors) were not qualified to reach conclusions regarding
causation. See id. at 597-98,67 P.3d at 76-77 (citing Bloching v. Albertson 's, Inc., 129 Idaho
844, 934 P.2d 17 (1997) (holding that a lay person was not qualified to testify that his seizures
were caused by using an insulin blend); Evans v. Twin Falls County, 118, Idaho 210,796 P.2d 87
(1990) (lay person not qualified to testify that deputies grabbing and shaking his wife caused her
death via cardiac arrest eleven months later); Flowerdew v. Warner, 90 Idaho 164,409 P.2d 110
(1965) (lay personlpatient not qualified to testify that his injury was caused by the medical
treatment he received)). The Swallow court also favorably quoted AM. JUR.2D's well-reasoned
analysis in Expert and Opinion Evidence:
Where the subject matter regarding the cause of disease, injury, or
death of a person is wholly scientific or so far removed from the
usual and ordinary experience of the average person that expert
knowledge is essential to the formation of an intelligent opinion,
only an expert can competently give opinion evidence as to the
cause of death, disease, or physical condition.

Swallow, 138 Idaho at 598,67 P.3d at 77 (quoting 3 1A AM. JUR.2~ Expert & Opinion Evidence
207) (emphasis added).

In Swallow, the issue was whether Swallow's lieart attack was caused by taking a
large and improperly-prescribed dose of the antibiotic Cipro. There, this Court affirmed the
district court's conclusion that the lack of expert testimony regarding causation was fatal to
plaintiffs claim against one of the physician defendants. Specifically, the court held:

Whether or not the Cipro taken by Mr. Swallow was a cause of
his heart attack is a matter of science that is far removedfrom
the usual and ordinary experience of the averageperson. A jury,
comprised of lay people, is simply not qualified to determine that
issue without the assistance of expert testiinony establishing that
Cipro can cause a myocardial infarction. Absent such testimony,
any finding in that regard would be based upon speculation. In
granting the motion for summaryjudgment, the district court
wrote, "[I]n this case without some reliable expert testimony
relating Cipro to myocardial infarction, there is no chain of
circumstances from which causation reasonably could be inferred."
The district court did not err in granting Dr. Blahd's motion for
summary judgment.

Swallow, 138 Idaho at 598, 67 P.3d at 77 (emphasis added).
Here, plaintiff bears the burden of proof in establishing that the care and treatment
administered by Dr. Binnion caused him to develop CPM. Just as in Swallow, the question here
whether a rise in serum sodium levels from 96 to 105 mEq./L over a six-hour period is sufficient
to eventually cause CPM "is a matter of science that is far removed from the usual and ordinary
experience of the average person." In fact, as will be shown below, whether Dr. Binnion's
treatment of Mr. Harrison over a two hour and forty minute period caused him to develop CPM
is a question that plaintiffs own experts cannot answer. Because plaintiff's experts were unable
to make a causal connection between defendant's care and plaintiffs injuries, there is no
admissible evidence of causation. Without evidence of causation, plaintiff cannot as a matter of
law meet his burden in going forward, there can be no genuine issue of material fact, and
summary judgment must be granted, a result that should occur regardless of how vehemently his
experts assert their opinions.

2.

Both of plaintiff's medical experts testified that they did not know
whether the rise in Mr. Harrison's sodium level from 96 mEq.lL. at
12:49 a.m. to 105 mEq./L. at 6:00 a.m. caused Mr. Harrison to
develop CPM.
a.

Dr. Laureno.

The main argument advanced by plaintiff on appeal is premised upon a
misreading of the testimony offered by his experts. Plaintiff argues that the "primary basis" for
Judge Copsey's decision was "that Dr. Laureno . . . testified that, had the rate of sodium
replacement been slowed considerably at 6:00 a.m. when the lab report showed a sodium level
of 105, he could not say that it was more likely than not that Mr. Harrison would have suffered
from CPM." Appellant's Brief, pp. 45-46 (emphasis added) (citing R., Vol. 11, pp. 295-99). A
review of the cited portion of the District Court's order, however, shows that plaintiffs argument
is an incomplete representation of both the record and Dr. Laureno's testimony. The District
Court's order cited to pages 123-24 of Dr. Laureno's testimony, where he was asked to address
the change in Mr. Harrison's sodium level between 12:49 a.m. and 6:00 a.m. on November 15,
2003, and whether the increase from 96 mEq./L to 105 mEq./L during that six hour period "was
a substantial factor in causing his CPM." (Emphasis added.) R., Vot. 11, p. 327, Exhibit 25,
Exhibit B (Deposition Transcript of Robert Laureno, M.D.), p. 123, LL. 7-25. Thus, the focus of
the question presented to Dr. Laureno did not involve a change in sodium replacement at (and

followillg) 6:00 a.m.; instead, the call of the question clearly focused upon the rise in
Mr. Harrison's sodium level between 12:49 and 6:00 am.-the

period of time that includes the

two hours and forty minutes in which Mr. Harrison was under Dr. Binnion's care. Speaking to
that period of time and the corresponding elevation in sodium levels, Dr. Laureno testified that "I

can't say with certainty that this change, without any subsequent change, would have resulted

in any CPM." Id., p. 124, LL. 8-16 (emphasis added). The fact that Dr. Laureno expressly
differentiated between "this change" (i.e., the change in sodium levels between 12:49 and 6:OO)
and "any subsequent change" (i.e., after 6:OO) very clearly indicates that he understood the
limited scope of the question, and he testified that he could not make a causal connection
between the treatment rendered by Dr. Binnion and the CPM that developed thereafter. Plaintiff,
on the other hand, has attempted to direct this Court's attention to the period of time after 6:00,
suggesting that the underlying issue was whether "the CPM might have been prevented had the
sodium replacement been slowed considerably at 6:00 a.m." Appellant's Brief, p. 46 (emphasis
added). Dr. Laureno's testimony cited above, however, was limited strictly to the sodium levels
for which Dr. Binnion was responsible, and he plainly stated that he could not state with any
certainty, much less a reasonable degree of medical certainty, that the change between 12:49 and
6:00 "would have resulted in any CPM."
b.

Dr. Navar.

Having failed to establish a causal nexus through Dr. Laureno's testimony
plaintiff has attempted to convince this Court, just as he attempted to convince the District Court,
that Dr. Navar (his standard of care expert) nevertheless offered a sufficient opinion on the issue
of causation. See Appellant's Brief, pp. 46-49. In support of this position, plaintiff has pointed
to Dr. Navar's "testimony" that "Dr. Binnion's breach of the prevailing local standard of care as
identified above was a substantial factor in causing the condition of Central Pontine Myelinolysis
in Mr. Harrison." R., Vol. 11, p. 327, Exhibit 25, Exhibit A, p. 50, LL. 11-14. Dr. Navar had

been disclosed as a standard of care expeit, but since plaintiff raised the issue of causation in his
expert disclosure of Dr. Navar, defendant explored his apparent opinion on this topic as well,
eliciting the following testimony:
Q.

Okay. And I'd like you to -well, we know that the sodium
was continued at 200 cc's from 6 a.m. to 12:27 at which
point he had reached a sodium level of 110.
Now, by that point, Doctor, Dr. Hartford had been in to see
the patient, had he not?

A.

Yes.

Q.

Okay. Would you agree with me that at that point in time,
the responsibility for the patient had transferred to
Dr. Hartford?

A.

Yes.

Q.

Okay. Would you agree with me that if the sodium
administration had been stopped or decreased at that point
in time, that the likelihood of Mr. Harrison getting CPM
would have decreased greatly?

A.

I don't know the answer to that question.

Q.

What would you need to know to answer the question?

A.

I don't know whether that initial increase from 96 to 110
over a 12-hour period would have been enough to result in
the insult just by itself.

Q.

And that was 14 milliequivalents in approximately a 12hour period of time?

A.

Right.

0.
.

Okav. How about the 9 millieauivalent increase in the
approximate six-hour period of time from 0049 to 6 a.m.,
would that in and o f itself have been enough to cause
CPM in Mr. Harrison?
A

A.

I don 't know.

See id., p. 105, L. 17-p.

106, L. 20 (emphasis added).

Dr. Navar, like Dr. Laureno, offered testimony that dealt solely with the change in
Mr. Harrison's sodium levels between 12:49 and 6:00 a.m., and like Dr. Laureno, Dr. Navar
stated that he did not know if the change during Dr. Binnion's care could have caused CPM in
Mr. Harrison. Since neither of plaintiffs experts is able to offer testimony establishing to a
reasonable degree of medical certainty that the rise in Mr. Harrison's sodium level while under
Dr. Binnion's care caused plaintiff to develop CPM, plaintiff has failed to establish an essential
element of his case, and entry of summary judgment is required.
3.

The analysis suggested by plaintiff under Newberry v. Martens is
misplaced since the testimony of Dr. Laureno indicates that there was
a single cause for Mr. Harrison's CPM.

Hoping to avoid the legal effect of his failure to provide medical evidence on the
issue of causation, plaintiff has once again turned to Newberry v. Martens, 142 Idaho 284, 127
P.3d 187 (2005), arguing that there are multiple possible causes at issue in this case, and that
therefore the proper standard is the "substantial factor" analysis. See Appellant's Brief, pp. 4749. In support of this argument, plaintiff has endeavored to create separate "causative factors"
(i.e., Dr. Binnion's "failure to slow the rate of sodium replacement," her "failure to communicate
concerns that lab values be reported immediately," and her "failure to ensure that Mr. Harrison
was admitted to the ICU"). However, each of these "separate" theories may be reduced to a
single, common factor: each claimed breach, if true, resulted in the same increase in plaintiffs

sodium levels that were attributed to Dr. Binnion elsewhere. As such, the "separate" factors
were, in reality, merely restatements of the same alleged causative factor.
Plaintiff argued to the District Court that "Dr. Laureno testified there was no
other cause of the CPM than the rapid elevation of the sodium level in Mr. Harrison's case,"

which representation undermines the "substantial factor" position taken by plaintiff on appeal
R., Vol. 11, p. 327, Exhibit 31 (Plaintiffs' Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant D. Lee
Binnion's Motion for Partial Summary. Judgment), p. 11 (emphasis added). See also R., Val. 11,
p. 327, Exhibit 30, Exhibit A (Deposition Transcript of Robert Laureno, M.D.), p. 50, LL. 9-18.
Counsel for plaintiff made similar representations at the summary judgment hearing, arguing
clearly that according to both Dr. Laureno and Dr. Navar, the sole factor in causing plaintiff's
CPM was the rapid elevation of sodium. Tr., Vol. I, p. 165, L. 16 - p. 166, L. 13. As noted
above, and to borrow the language of counsel from the hearing, neither Dr. Navar nor

Dr. Laureno knew to a reasonable degree of medical certainty whether the rise in sodium during
"theperiod of time [Dr. Binnion] was treating [Mr. HaravrinJ" caused his CPM. See id., p.

166, LL. 6-7. Similarly, neither Dr. Navar or Dr. Laureno have been able to state to a reasonable
degree of medical certainty that any brain damage was caused before Dr. Hartford saw plaintiff
at 1 1:17 on the morning of November 15,2003. But for purposes of the Newberiy analysis, it is
sufficient to note that, according to plaintiffs counsel, both Dr. Laureno and Dr. Navar believed
that the cause of Mr. Harrison's CPM was the sodium replacement rate. As if to drive this point
home, plaintiff also represented in his Appellant's Brief Cpp. 7, 49) that the "rapid elevation" of
Mr. Harrison's sodium level was the sole cause of his CPM. Given Dr. Laureno's testimony and

the representations made before this Court, plaintiff's reliance upon Newbery is both improper
and misplaced.
This Court previously held in Newbery that "the 'but for' test may be employed
when there is a singlepossible cause." Newbevy, 142 Idaho at 288 (emphasis added).

Accepting as true Dr. Laureno's testimony that the sole cause of Mr. Harrison's CPM was the
"rapid elevation" of his sodium levels, and that the change in Mr. Harrison's sodium levels while
he was under Dr. Binnion's care cannot be said to a reasonable degree of medical certainty to
have caused that CPM, the only possible resolution of this case is entry of summary judgment in
Dr. Binnion's favor.
Assuming for purposes of summary judgment, however, that the substantial factor
analysis is required, both of plaintiff's experts failed or refused to establish that the care provided
by Dr. Binnion was a substantial factor in causing Mr. Harrison's injury. Dr. Navar stated during
his deposition that defendant's alleged breach of the local standard of care "as identified above
was a substantialfactor" in causing plaintiff's CPM. R., Vol. 11, p. 327, Ex. 25, Ex. A, p. 50,
LL. 12-14 (emphasis added). However, when lie was given the opportunity to male the causal
connection between Dr. Binnion's alleged breach and Mr. Harrison's injury, Dr. Navar was
forced to concede that'he "did not know" whether defendant's treatment was "enough to cause
CPM in Mr. Harrison." Id., p. 106, LL. 7,20. Because he does not know if the care and
treatment provided by Dr. Binnion caused plaintiffs CPM at all, Dr. Navar cannot say to a
reasonable degree of medical certainty that Dr. Binnion's alleged breach of the local standard of
care was "a substantial factor in causing" Mr. Harrison's injury.

Similarly, Dr. Laureno was given an opportunity to opine on the substantial factor
issue, yet he could not offer any admissible testimony against defendant either. Even though
Dr. Laureno was clear in stating that there was but a single possible cause of plaintiffs injury
(see R., Val. TI, p. 327, Ex. 30, Ex. A, p. 50, LL. 9-18), he was nevertheless asked: "Can you say

that the change in Mr. Harrison's sodium levels during that period of time [from 12:49 to
6:00 a.m. on November 15, 20031 was a substantial factor in causing (ylai~ztiffSJ CPM?'R.,
Val. 11, p. 327, Ex. 25, Ex. B, p. 123, LL. 22-25 (emphasis added). After carefully clarifying that
the scope of his opinion dealt solely with the issue of whether the "rise in sodium, not the
replacement of the sodium" was the cause of plaintiffs CPM, Dr. Laureno answered in the
negative. See id.,p. 124, LL. 14-16, and p. 126, L. 25.

The evidence of record establishes that neither of plaintiffs experts can say
Dr. Binnion's care and treatment of Mr. Harrison caused his CPM, or even that such care was a
substantial factor in causing his CPM. Thus, whether the Court applies a "but for" analysis, or a
"substantial factor" analysis, the net result is the same: there is simply no evidence in this case
that the rise in Mr. Harrison's sodium level caused or contributed to his CPM.
4.

The District Court properly determined that the remaining opinions
of plaintiff's experts were speculative and would not assist the trier of
fact.
a.

Evidentiary standard for an expert opinion.

A motion for summary judgment requires that the court look to the threshold
question of whether the evidence is admissible under Idaho Rule of Evidence ("I.R.E.") 702

before moving on to the more liberal construction of Rule 56(c). This two-step process was
described by this Court in Carnell v. Barlcer Management, 137 Idaho 322,48 P.3d 651 (2002):
I.R.C.P. 56(e) provides that the adverse party may not rest upon
mere allegations in the pleadings, but must set forth by affidavit
specificfacts showing there is a genuine issue for trial.
Rhodehouse v. Sutts, 125 Idaho 208,211,868 P.2d 1224, 1227
(1994) (citation omitted). [. . .] "The admissibility of the evidence
contained in affidavits and depositions in support of or in
opposition to a motion for summary judgment is a threshold
question to be answered before applying the liberal construction
and reasonable inferences rule to determine whether the
evidence is sufficient to create a genuine issue for trial." West v.
Sonke, 132 Idaho 133, 138,968 P.2d 228,233 (1998).
Carnell, 137 Idaho at 327,48 P.3d at: 656 (emphasis added).

Idaho law requires that the court look at the underlying evidence when analyzing
whether a genuine issue of material fact exists. Although Idaho has not formally adopted the
reporting requirements of the federal Daubevt standard, Idaho courts similarly require the
plaintiff to comply with the strict requirements of I.R.E. 702, which states in relevant part:
If scientijic, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist
the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact
in issue, a witness qualzjZed as an expert by knowledge, skill,
experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in the form
of an opinion or otherwise.

(Emphasis added.)
Idaho courts uniformly hold that I.R.E. 702 requires an expert opinion to be
founded upon "scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge" and must be based upon
"factual foundation." Carnell, 137 Idaho at 328,48 P.3d at 657. "An expert opinion that is
speculative or unsubstantiated by facts in the record is inadmissible because it would not assist

the trier of fact to understand the evidence or determine a fact that is at issue." Swallow, 138
Idaho at 592 (citations omitted). If there is no factual foundation for an expert's opinion, then
the evidence is not admissible under I.R.E. 702. Of course, without underlying evidence, there
can be no genuine issue of material fact and a motion for summary judgment must be granted.
b.

Dr. Navar's implication of a causal connection is speculative
and unsupported by any factual foundation in the record.

Not only has plaintiff failed to offer evidence that the care provided by
Dr. Binnion caused, or was a substantial factor in causing his injuries, he has failed to establish
that defendant's other alleged breaches of the standard of care had a causative effect as well.
Plaintiff argues that Dr. Binnion breached the local standard of care by "failing to properly
communicate within her physician's orders, at the time they were written, her concerns about the
rapid elevation of sodium and that all laboratory values be immediately communicated to the
attending physician. . . ." Appellant's Brief, p. 50. This purported failure, he further argues, was
a "substantial factor in causing" Mr. Harrison's CPM. Id. Similarly, plaintiff insists that
Dr. Binnion's "fail[ure] to ensure that Mr. Harrison was admitted to the ICU unit" was also a
"substantial factor in causing Mr. Hamson's injuries." Id., p. 52. These arguments depend
entirely upon the underlying theory that if there had been "proper" communication within
Dr. Binnion's physician's orders, or if Mr. Harrison had been "properly" admitted to the ICU, his
sodium replacement rate would have been slowed and he would not have developed CPM. Both
of these theories require speculation on the part of plaintiffs experts, and as such, they are
specious and unsupportable as a matter of law. Moreover, the alleged failures referenced in this
section of plaintiffs argument go solely to whether there was a breach of the local standard of

care, but do not establish that any such breach, even if proven, actually caused or contributed to
plaintiffs injury.
When asked specifically about his criticism on the communication issue,
Dr. Navar stated that his only opinion was that Dr. Binnion's concern over rapid eltivation did
not appear to be communicated to the nursing staff. See R., Vol. 11, p. 327, Ex. 25, Ex. A, p. 60,

LL. 2-12. It is undisputed, however, that Dr. Binnion's concern in this regard was
communicated in ~nultiplefonns. Dr. Binnion expressly noted her concerns over replacement
rate in the Emergency Department Report:

I have started an IV of nonnal saline and given the patient some
potassiunl and Phenergan. I have spoken with Dr. Hartford, who
is on call for Dr. Minus, and I will be admitting the patient into the
hospital. I am going to go ahead and start him on normal saline
boluses. I think that his sodium has taken quite some lime to get
this low, and I d o not want to replace it too quickly as that could
cause cerebral edema. He will need probably thiamine and
multivitamin replacements along with this.
R., Vol. 11, p. 326, Ex. 17, Ex. 1, Bates No. 000562 (emphasis added).
Dr. Binnion also testified about the discussion she had with Dr. Hartford, which is
referenced in the Emergency Department Report:

Q.

Now, when you talked to Dr. Hartford, tell me everything
you recall being discussed.

A.

I told him that the patient was hyponatremic. My
recollection is that I initially said, "Let's put him on
telemetry."
And then he - at some point in the conversation it did come
up that alcohol was an issue. And I think he suggested, you
know, telemetry might be a little bit overstimulating for
him. Do you think he would be okay on the floor?

And I think I felt that he would be okay 011 the floor with
the general medical treatment because he was looking like I said, with the sodium being so low he really looked
pretty good. So I think I understood his concern about, you
know, the stimulus in the telemetry unit increasing his risk
of having problems with the detox firom the alcohol. So we
decided to put him on the medical floor.
And I did discuss with him that I was going to continue
his fluids at a rehydration rate and that I would be
checking chemistries on a regular basis. And I asked him
if the patient had anyproblems, would he be arourzd.
And he said yes.

Q.

Okay. Do you recall anything else being discussed?

A.

You might jog my memory, but that's off the top of my
head all I remember.

Q.

You said you'd continue fluids at a rehydration rate. Did
you talk to him about what the particular rate was?

A.

I believe I said 200 cc an hour.

Q.

You specifically recall telling him that you had initiated
orders of sodium replacement at 200 CCs an hour?

A.

Yes.

Q.

Did you inform Dr. Hartford that you had ordered two
boluses of saline prior to initiating those order?

A.

I don't remember.

Q.

Okay. Didyou indicated to Dr. Hartford how ofkn the
chemical labs would be takerz?

A.

Yes.

Q.

And what did you tell him?

A.

That they'd be every six hours.

R., Vol. 11, p. 327, Ex. 25, Ex. C, p. 111, L. 8 - p. 113, L. 1 (emphasis added).

The evidence adduced in discovery clearly shows that rather than failing to
communicate her concerns over replacement rate and the need for monitoring of blood chemistry
panels, Dr. Binnion noted such concerns in the chart and personally discussed them with
plaiiltiffs attending physician. It should also be noted that whether or not defendant's concerns
were verbally communicated to the nursing staff, her concerns over replacement rate were
charted and discussed with the attendingphysician, and the sodium levels were being
monitored by way of blood work every six hours.

Dr. Navar further opined that Dr. Bimion's "failure" to ensure that Mr. Harrison
was admitted to the ICU" was a "substantial factor" in causing his CPM. Dr. Navar
acknowledged in his deposition that defendant, as the Emergency Department physician, did not
have admitting privileges. R., Val. 11, p. 327, Ex. 25, Ex. A, p. 23, LL. 1-16. It has never been
disputed that Dr. Binnion did not have admitting privileges at SARMC in November 2003. R.,
Val. 11, p. 282. Thus, regardless of her recommendation for placement, the admitting physician
was the only person in a position to "ensure that Mr. Harrison was admitted to the ICU," and he
was the only person with the ability to titrate the rate of sodium replacement.
Finally, as noted above, plaintiffs argument that Dr. Bimion's "breach" ofthe
standard of care was a "substantial factor" in causing plaintiffs injuries depends upon evidence
that had defendant's concerns been communicated directly to the nursing staff, or had
Mr. Harrison been admitted to the ICU, the sodium replacement rate would have been changed.
First, such a position rests entirely upon conjecture, and no such opinion from plaintiffs experts
would be admissible to establish a genuine issue of material fact. Secondly, the evidence in the

record indicates that even if the alleged breaches had not occurred, the replacement rate would
not have changed. There is no dispute that while Dr. Hartford did not see plaintiff at 6:00 a.m.
on November 15, he did see plaintiff at 11:17 that morning (see R., Val. 11, p. 326, Ex. 17, Ex. 1,
Bates No. 000067), and after exanlining the patient and the chart, Dr. Hartford did not alter the
sodium replacement rate. Accordingly, Dr. Navar's conclusory opinion that a change in
plaintiffs care would have occurred had defendant "properly" communicated her concerns or
"ensured" that plaintiff was admitted to the ICU is not only based upon pure speculation, but it is
also contrary to the evidence of record.
The standard of care opinions expressed by Dr. Navar are speculative at best.
Furthermore, because those opinions merely assert, but do not establish a causal connection,
there is no evidence to support aprima facie case for medical negligence. In light of the
foregoing, the District Court's grant of summary judgment should be affirmed.
V.

ATTORNEY FEES ON APPEAL

Respondent requests attorney fees on appeal pursuant to Rules 35 and 41 Idalto
Appellate Rules, and Idaho Code Section 12-121. Under Idaho law, attorney fees may be
awarded on appeal pursuant to Idaho Code Section 12-121 if the "Court is left with the abiding
belief that the appeal was brought or pursued frivolously, unreasonably, and without
foundation." See Rowley v. Fuhrman, 135 Idaho 105, 110,982 P.2d 940 (1999). This Court has
long held that attorney fees "are awardable if an appeal does no more than simply invite an
appellate court to second-guess the trial court on conflicting evidence, or if the law is well settled
and appellant has made no substantial showing that the district court misapplied the law."

Johnson v. Edwards, 113 Idaho 660,662,747 P.2d 69 (1987). In other words, when a

"dispassionate view of the record discloses that there is no valid reason to anticipate reversal of
the judgment below," attorney fees should be awarded. Rueth v. State, 103 Idaho 74,81,644
P.2d 1333 (1982).

In this case, plaintiff has simply asked this Court to reevaluate the evidence or
second-guess the District Court's well-reasoned decision granting defendant's motion for
summaryjudgment. No substantial legal argument has been presented, and defendant should be
awarded attorney fees on appeal.
VI.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, respondent respectfully requests this Court to affirm
the District Court's entry of summary judgment and award defendant her attorney fees on appeal.
DATED this 13th day of August, 2008.

D. Lee Binnion, M.D.
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STATEMENT OF T H E CASE
A.

Nature of the Case a n d Course of Proceedings
This is a medical negligence case in which Plaintiff-Appellant H. Ray Harrison also

attempted to assert a claim for negligent granting of medical staff credentials against DefendantRespondent Saint Alphonsus Regional Medical Center, Inc. (';Saint Alphonsus"). The primary
issue in this appeal is whether the district court correctly ruled that the immunity provisions of
Idaho's Peer Review Act bar a cause of action for negligent credentialing arising out of the
ganting of hospital privileges to a physician.
In his original complaint, filed on April 28, 2004, Harrison alleged medical negligence
claims against Dr. D. Lee Binnion, Dr. Jeffrey

and Saint Alphonsus, claiming that they

had allowed his sodium levels to rise too quickly after he arrived at the Saint Alphonsus
Emergency Department with dangerously low levels of sodium in his bloodstream. R. Vol. I, p.
22-32. Dr. Hartford was the physician who admitted Harrison to the hospital and who treated
him for several days thereafter. R. Vol. I, p. 24, q/ 10. On November 15, 2005, Harrison sought
to arnend his complaint to include a claim for negligent credentialing against Saint Alphonsus.
R. Vol. I, pp. 116-131. In the proposed amendment, Harrison alleged that Saint Alphonsus was
negligent in allowing Dr. Hartford privileges to practice in its facilities. R. Vol. I, p. 126. Saint
Alphonsus opposed this motion on the basis that 1.C. $ 39-1392c precluded such a cause of
action. R. Vol. I, pp. 58-64.
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The district judge heard Harrison's request to amend his complaint on April 6, 2006. Tr.
pp. 54-103. The district judge indicated that she believed I.C. § 39-1392c did provide immunity
from negligent credentialing claims, but indicated she would issue a written opinion on the
subject.

Tr. p. 91, L. 6-p. 92, L. 14, and p. 124, L1. 4-16.

I-Iarrison thereafter filed a

Supplemental Citatiou of Authorities, R. Vol. I, pp. 178-82, to which Saint Alphonsus respo~lded
on April 20, 2006. Exhibit to R. #24. On May 18, 2006, the trial judge issued an opinion
holding that the immu~lityprovisions of I.C. § 39-1392c barred Harrison's claim for negligent
credentialing. R. Vol. 1, pp. 183-213.
The parties continued to litigate the re~naillingnegligence claims. FIarriso~lsettled with
Dr. Hartford, and on August 25, 2006, the trial court dismissed Dr. Hartford from the case
pursuant to the parties' stipulation. R. Vol. 11, pp. 249-50 and Exhibit to R. # 33 at Exhibit "A."
On July 6, 2007, Dr. Bi~lnionobtained summary judgment. R. Vol. 11, pp. 280-99. Harrison and
Saint Alpbonsus settled the remaining claims regarding nursing negligence. Confidential Exhibit
to R. K1. This settlement, however, allowed Harrison to appeal the trial court's decision that the
immunity provisions of I.C. $ 39-1392c barred his negligent credentiali~lgclaim. Id. T l ~ etrial
court entered final judgment on September 27,2007. R. Vol. 11, pp. 307-309.

B.

Statement of Facts

This is not a case that requires the Court to make factual findings. The issue to be
decided is purely legal -- whether the immunity provisions of Idaho's Peer Review Act preclude
FIanison's claim for negligent credentialing.

However, Saint Alphonsus disagrees with

t-Iarrison's Statement of Facts, and is providing t.he following factual discussion for context. The
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district judge also provided a detailed summary of the facts in her May 18, 2006 Order Denying
Motions to Amcnd. R. Vol. I, pp. 204-209.
Dr. Hartford is a family practice physician with a history of alcoholism and d ~ u g
addiction. It. Vol. I, p. 204, L. 12. In 1995, he entered into the first of several stipulations with
the Idaho State Board of Medicine designed to address these addictions. R. Vol. 1, p. 204, Ll.
12-23. In 1997, following a licellse suspension, he entered into a contract with the Idaho
Medical Association's Physician Recovery Network ("PRN). R. Vol. I, p. 205, L1. 5-7. The
PRN is a "peer assistance entity" under I.C.
Exhibit to R. #21 at

7 7.

5

54-4401(2). R. Vol. I, p. 204, L1. 20-21, and

"Peer assistance entities" are organizations specifically created to

address issues of "chemical dependency and/or impainnent, psychological impairment, and
lnental or physical impairment" that affect members of the health care profession. I.C.

5

54-

4401(2). Peer assistance entities such as the PRN "assist the board [of medicine] in performing
its duties, implementing disciplinary actions or sanctions, and in addressing potential or
confinned problems of chemical dependency andlor impairnlent" that affect health care
professionals. 1.C. 5 54-4402(1).
When a physician in the PRN is under stipulation with the Board of Medicine because of
concerns about chemical dependency or other impairment, the PRN monitors the physician for
the Board of Medicine. Exhibit to R. # 12 at Exhibit "C," p. 68, L. 14-p. 70, L. 15. If the
physician has staff privileges at Saint Alphonsus, the ERN also provides the hospital with regular
reports on his progress. Exhibit to R. # 21,

7

10. At all tinles relevant to this lawsuit, Dr.

Hartford was a participant in the PRN, whose stipulations with the Board of Medicine required
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him to submit to weeltly random urine screenings. Exhibit to R. # 12 at Exhibits " E (Stipulation
and Order at p. 3, and Second Amended Stipulation and Order at p. 3), and "C" at p. 25, L. 14-p.
27, L. 8 and p. 103, LI. 19-21. See also, R. Vol. I p. 205, L. 22.
The Saint Alphonsus Medical Staff Credentials Manual sets forth the peer review process
the hospital undertakes when passing on applications for membel-ship to its medical staff. See
Medical Staff Credentials Manual at pp. 1-17 (Exhibit to R. # 12 at Exhibit "D").'

For

physicians who have a history of alcohol or drug addiction, Saint Alphonsus's policies include
adhering to the strictures of the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA") to determine whether
such a physician can safely practice medicine.' See, Saint Alphonsus Medical Staff Policies and
Plans at pp. 32-36 (Exhibit to R. # 12 at Exhibit " D ) . Because of the PRN's special expertise in
addressing issues of chemical dependency in practitioners, Saint Alphonsus relies upon the
PRN's assessment of whether a physician in that program has recovered fro111 addiction to
alcohol or drugs and can safely practice medicine. Exhibit to R. #21 at qjqj 4-12. Saint Alpilonsus
followed its policies and procedures, including its policy of relying upon the PRN's
recommendations, in credentialiilg Dr. Hartford in 2001, and in renewing his credentials in 2003.

Id.
When, in March of 2003, ail employee in the Saint Alphonsus credentialing office
believed she smelled alcohol on Dr. Haitford's breath, Saint Alphonsus infonned the PRN. R.
Vol. 1, p. 205, LI. 20-28, and Exhibit to R. K 12 at Exhibit "C," p. 89, L. 8-p. 91, L. 17. The

I

The refereticed Exhibit " D contains several Saint Alphonsus policies and procedures.
A pl~ysiciai~
denied staff privileges at a hospital may sue under Title 111 of the ADA even tliouglr he may not be a
hospital employee. See, Levinger v. Mercy Medical Center, 139 Idaho 192, 198,75 P.3d 1202, 1208 (2003).
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PRN informed the Board of Medicine, which required Dr. Hartford to submit to a drug and
alcohol test and to undergo an evaluation at a treatment center in Louisiana (the "Palmetto
evaluation"). R. Vol. I, p. 206, L. 1-5; Exhibit to R. K12 at Exhibit "D," p. 39, L. 21-p. 40, L. 16.
The results of the alcohol test were inconclusive. R. Vol. I, p. 206, L1.-5. The Palmetto
evaluation, which was provided to the PRN in March of 2003, expressed some reservations about
Dr. Hartford's candor, but concluded that his addictions to both alcohol and drugs were "in
re~nission." Exhibit to R. # 12 at Exhibit "D," p. 41, L1. 4-7 and p. 56, L. 14-p. 57, L. 6.3 Saint
Alphonsus renewed Dr. I-Ia~tford'sprivileges in the summer of 2003, following the Palmetto
evaluation and after the head of the Saint Alphonsus Medical Staff interviewed Dr. Elartford. R.
Vol. I at p. 206; Exhibit to R. # l 7 at Exhibit 3, p. 207, LI. 3-1 1 and p. 209, L. 1 - p. 210, L.G.
On November 14,2003, Harrison arrived at the Saint Alphonsus Emergency Department.
Dr. Binnion detennined that he was experiencing symptoms of profound hyponatremia. R. Vol.

I, pp. 23-24. Dr. Hartford admitted Hanison to the hospital and treated him over the course of
the following week. Id. In December of 2003, Saint Alphoilsus informed the PRN of a concern
raised by Julie Anderson, Harrison's then-fiancbe, that she had smelled alcohol on Dr. Hartford's
breath. R. Vol. 1, p. 209, LI. 1-2; Exhibit to R. # 12 at Exhibit "C," p. 196, L. 21 - p. 197, L 14.
Saint Alphonsus informed the PRN, which in turn informed the Board of Medicine of the
hospital's concern that Dr. Hartford might have relapsed. R. Vol. I, p. 209, L1. 1-6. This time,

Although the Palmetto report was discussed in the testimony of witnesses at the Board of Medicine disciplinaly
hearings, it has not been produced to the parlies in this case because the district court concluded that Dr. Hartford's
medical records and PRN records were privileged.
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the Board of Medicine obtained a positive alcohol test, and instituted disciplinary proceedings
against Dr. Hartford. Id. See also Exhibit to. R. # l 2 at Exhibit "C," p. 102, L. 9 - p. 108, L. 11.
The Board of Medicine suspended Dr. Hartford's license for six months, and also ruled
that his license would be revoked for five years if he continued to use alcohol or drugs.
I-lowever, the hearing officer who presided over Dr. Hartford's disciplinary hearings stated, "the
Board was not faced with a discipline case where the physician has presented a pattern of
substandard care or of present endangerment to patients." R. Vol. I, p. 209, Ll. 6-29; Exhibit to

R. # 12 at Exhibit "B," pp. 28-29. And, while this case has been presented by Harrison to this
Court as involving the grant of privileges to a "dangerous" physician, Julie Anderson testified
that while she believed Dr. Hartford smelled like he had been drinking the night before, she dicl
not believe that he was intoxicated or impaired when he treated Harrison. R. Vol. I, pp. 206-208;
Exhibit to R. # 12. In fact, in a related proceeding against Dr. Hartford's insurance carrier,
Harrison himself has argued that there was actually no evidence that Dr. Hartford was ever
intoxicated while treating him at Saint ~ l p h o n s u s . ~
ADDITIONAL ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL

1.

Section 39-1392c of Idaho's Peer Review Act provides immunity against liability

for claims arising out of the receiving and "use" of information and opinions 1.elated to peer
review. Given that privileging and credentialing are peer review activities under the Peer

"n his settletllenl with Dr. Hartford, Harrison obtained an assignment of Dr. I-lartford's claims against his insurer,
Lloyds of London. Exhibit to R. # 33 at Exhibit A. Excerpts of sutnlnary judgrncnt briefing in the case against
Lloyds of London, in which Harrison asserted there was no evidence of intoxication, wel-e provided to the district
court via the Affidavit of Elaine 1s. Lee filed on June 28,2007 (Exhibits 'Ti"and "1"). A Motion to Augmeiir the
Record has been filed herewith to add this document to the Record on Appeal.
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Review Act, is a hospital's act of granting privileges to a physician a "use" of peer review
infonnation, thus providing it with immunity from claims for negligent credentialing brought by
patients?
2.

Is Harrison entitled to appeal the district court's ruling that Dr. Hartford did not

waive the doctor-patient privilege for inedical records he submitted to tlie Board of Medicine?

ARGUMENT
I.

THE DISTRICT COUI<T CORRECTLY CONCLUDED THAT IDAIIO'S PEER
REVIEW ACT IMMUNIZES CLAIMS FOR NEGLIGENT CREDENTIALING.
A.

History of the Idaho Peer Review Act.

Enacted in 1973, Idaho's Peer Review Act addressed a growing concern in the medical
profession that effective self-criticism was being stifled due to the fear that peer review records
would be discovered and subject to misinterpretation in subsequent litigation. See, Mzrvphy

11.

PVood, 105 Idaho 180, 184, 667 P.2d 859, 863 (Ct. App. 1983) (discussing Statement of Purj>ose

to 1973 Act). The Peer Review Act provides that records of pecr review proceedings are
privileged, and not admissible "in any action of any kind in any court . . . for any purpose
whatsoever." LC.

3

39-1392b. It also provides both health care organizations and individuals

who participate in peer review with immunity for causes of action arising out of "the furnishing
of information or provision of opinions" and the "receiving and use of such infonnation and
opinions" related to peer review. I.C.

3

39-1392~. These broad protectiol~sof confideiitiality

and immunity are "in the public interest because [they] encourage a free exchange of inedical
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infonnation tliat will ultimately benefit the public in the fonn of improved medical care."
Murphy v. Wood, 105 Idaho at 184,667 P.2d at 863.
In 2003, the legislature substantially amended the Peer Review Act.

The 2003

arnendme~~ts
added a number of activities co~nmonly conducted by hospitals, including
credentialing and privileging, to the definition of peer review. The expanded definition of "peer
review" now states in pertinent part:
Peer review nieans the collection, interpretation, and analysis of data by a
health care organization for the purpose of bettering the system of dclivel-y
of health care or to irnprove the provision of health care or to othetwisc
reduce patient morbidity and mortality and i~nprovethe quality of patient
care. Peer review activities by a health care organization include, without
limitation. . .
(a) Credentialing, privileging or affiliating of health care providers as
members of, or providers for, a health care organizatioti.
I.C. 8 39-1392a(l l)(a)
B.

The Immunity Provisions of I.C. § 39-1392c Prccludc a Cause of Action for
Negligent Crcdentialing, Because, in the Context of Credentialing Activities,
"Use" Can Only Mean "Using" Peer Review information to Grant or Deny
Credentials.

The Peer Review Act's immunity provisions appear in I.C. $ 39-1302~.They read:
The furnishing of information or provision of opinions to any health care
organization or the receiving and use of such inforination and opinions
shall not subject any health care organization or other person to any
liability or action for money darnages or other legat or equitable relief.
Custodians of such records and persons becoming aware of such data and
opinions shall not disclose the same except as authorized by rules adopted
by the board of medicine or as otherwise authorized by law. Any health
care organization may receive such disclosures, subject to an obligation to
preserve the confidential privileged character thereof and subject further to
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the requirement that such requests shall be made and such use shall be
limited to aid the health care organization in conducting peer review
1.C. § 39-1 392c.
The relevant statulory directive is that the "receiving and use of such information and
opinions shall not subject any health care organization or other person to any liability or action
for inoney damages or other legal or equitable relief." The reference to "such information and
opinions" can only mean "information and opinions related to peer review," because peer review
is the subject of the Act. The question to he resolved on this appeal turns on the meaning of the
word "use" in I.C.

5 39-1 392c.

1. Courts Interpret Statutes According to Their Plain Meaning, and if the
Meaning is Clear There is No Occasion for Statutory Construction.
Because statutory interpretation is a question of law, this Court exercises free review over
the district court's determination that the Peer Review Act precludes a cause of action for
negligent credentialing. See, e.g., Hanzilton ex rel. Hamilton v. Reeder Flying Svc., 135 Idaho
568, 571, 21 P.3d 890,893 (2001).
This Court has held that the language of the statute must be given its plain, obvious and
rational meaning. If the language of the statute is clear and unambiguous, "the clear expressed
intent of the legislature n ~ u s be
t given effect and there is no occasion for construction." See, e.g.,
Corporation of Presiding Bishop of Church ofJesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. Ada County,
123 Idaho 410, 415, 849 P.2d 83, 88 (1993). A statute is only ambiguous where reasonable
minds might differ as to its meaning, and "[a]mbiguity is not present in a statute simply because
the parties may present differing interpretations to the court." See, State
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1).

Doe, 140 Idaho 271,

274, 92 P.3d 521, 524 (2004). Ordinary words are to be given their ordinary meaning. See, e.g.

Bunt v. City of Garden City, 118 Idaho 427, 430, 797 P.2d 135, 138 (1990). Also, "[Ejvery
word, clause and sentence [in a statute] should be given effect, if possible." Matlev of Permit

No. 36-7200 in Name ofIdaho Department of P a r k and Rec. v. Higginson, 121 Idaho 819, 823,
828 P.2d 848, 852 (Idaho 1992).
"Unless the result is palpably absurd, this Court assumes the legislature meant what is
clearly stated in [a] statute." See, e.g. State v. Parlcinson, 144 Idaho 825, 827, 172 P.3d 1100,
1102 (Idaho 2007) (internal citations and quotations omitted). As the Court of Appeals has
observed, so long as "rational reasons for [the legislation] can be readily disccrned," courts must
refuse to interpret statutes in a manner that goes against their plain meaning. White v. Saint

Alphonsus Regional Medical Center, 136 Idaho 238, 241, 31 P.3d 926, 929 (Ct. App. 2001).
"[Ijf a law, as construed by the court, is to be changed, that is a legislative not a judicial
function." Corpovatioiz ofpresiding Dish011 ofChurch of Jesus Chvist oflatter-Day Saints, 123
Idaho 410,415, 849 P.2d 83, 88 (1993).
2. The Immunity Provisions of the Peer Review Act Are Broad, Covering

"Any Liability o r Action" That Might Arise Out of the Use of Peer
Review I~~formation.

Applying these rules to I.C. 5 39-1392c, there can be no doubt that the grant of innnunity
is intended to apply broadly. The statute clearly states that the "receiving" and "use" of peer
review information "shall not subject any health care organization or other person to any liability
or action for money damages or other legal or equitable relief." I.C.

5

39-1392c. This is not

language that allows for exceptions, or that limits the classes of lawsuits to which immunity
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applies. See, Von Lindevn v. Union Pacific Railroad Co., 94 Idaho 777, 779, 498 P.2d 34, 347
(1972) (holding that the word "any" in a statute indicates something "selected without restriction
or limitation of choice, . . . without exception; one, no matter what one; all" (quoting Emmolo v.

Southern Pacific Co., 204 P.2d 427 (1949)). See also, Kauntz v. HCA-Healthone LLC, 174 P.3d
8 13, 8 18-8 19 (Colorado App. 2007) (holding that Colorado's peer review act granting hospitals
immunity fkom "any" civil action arising from a professio~lalreview action encoinpassed a claim
for negligent credentialing). To conclude, as Harrison urges, that the language of I.C. $ 391392c was not intended to reach negligent credentialing claims by patients would be to engraft a
judicial exception onto the legislature's broad grant of immunity.
Throughout his brief, Harrison asserts that the legislature could not have intended to
provide blanket immui~ityfrom negligent credentialing claims. This assertion is untenable.
Because Idaho's Peer Review Act provides that health care organizations shall not be subject to
"any liability or action, " it creates not just a defense to liability, but irn~nunityfrom suit. The
effect of this immunity is to shield the deliberative process of peer review coin~nitteesfrom
second-g~~essing
in litigation. Lf the Court concludes that a hospital that grants staff privileges
does so by "using" peer review information, then it follows that the immunity provisions of I.C.
$ 39-1.392~must apply to negligent credentialing claims.
3. The Plain Meaning of the Word "Use" as it Appears in the Peer Review

Act Includes a Decision to Grant o r Deny Credentials.
The dictionary definitions of the vei-b "to use" confilm that the most common definition
of that word Incans "to einploy or utilize for a particular purpose." For example, the Compact
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Oxford English Dictionary defines "use" as meaning "to take, hold, or deploy as a means of
achieving something." See, www.askoxford.coin/concise~oed/use;(Appendix A to Respondent's
Brief.) Other related definitions include "to employ for some purpose, put into service," or "to
COLLEGE
DICTIONARY
carry out a purpose or action by means of." See, WEBSTER'SUNIVERSAL
at p. 866 (1997), and www.merrian1-webster.com/dictionary/use(Appendices B and C,
respectively, to Respondent's ~rief).' The United States Supreme Court has held, in the context
of the federal arson statute, that "the word 'use,' in legislation as in conversation, ordinarily
signifies 'active empioyment."' Jones v. United States, 529 9J.S. 848, 855, 120 S.Ct. 1904, 1910
(2001). The Ninth Circuit has also defined the word "use" as meaning "to put into action or
service, avail oneself of, employ." Af-Cap., Inc. v. Chevron Overseas (Congo), L t d , 475 F.3d
1080, 1088 (9th Cis. 2007) (interpreting word "use" in context of the waiver provisions of the
Foreign Sovereign immunity Act)
"Use" in the sense of "active employment" or "putting into action or service" is precisely
the detinition that the district court ascribed to the word. The district court explained:
St. Alphonsus, as a health care organization, is immune from civil suit for
the use of inJoun2ation in credentialing a physician. While the Hall-isons
suggest that "use of information" does not create immunity for the act of
credentialing, their contention is nonsensicaI. The Court cannot agree
with the Harrisons' strained interpretation. The Harrisons' logic would
place this C o u ~ tin the untenable position of granting St. Alphonsus
immunity for reading the material but simultaneously holding St.
Alphonsus liable for using the contents read by the committee in the
material when granting or denying credentials. As St. Alphonsus

I While there are other delinitions of the word "use," they include "to consume, expend, or exhaust," "to treac or
behave towards," "to take unfair advantage of;" or "to drink, smoke, or ingest habitually." These definitions make
no sense in the context of the Pecr Review Act.
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contends, the act of issuing the credential is the ullimate use of
cvedentialing material.

R. Vol. I, p. 190, L1. 15-21. The district court also observed that by definition, immunity relates
to actions taken or decisions made. The trial judge stated, "The Court can imagine no tort claim
arising from the mere reading of or handling of such material.

Irnlnunity would only be

necessary to immunize actions taken. If 'use o f does not include the act of credentialing, it
would be superfluous." R. Vol. 1. p. 190, L1. 12-21.

C.

The Immunity Provisions of I.C. $39-1392c Are Not Ambiguous.

In an effort to overcome the plain language of I.C. $ 39-1392c, Harrison argues that the
statute is ambiguous. However, he failed to make this argu~nentin the trial court, where he
clainled that the statute unainbiguously did not preclude a cause of action for negligent
credentialing. Tr. p. 63, LI. 17-19. Because Harrison has raised this issue for the first time on
appeal, the Court should decline to consider it. See, Highlands Development Corp. v. City of'
Boise, -- P.3d

-,

2008 WL 2437838 at '8 (Idaho 2008).

111 any case, the argulnent that the statute is ainbiylous should be rejected. Harrison
attetnpts.to draw a distinction between "use" of peer review information and "decisions" about a
doctor's credentials, but this is a false dichotomy. As the district court noted, the decision to
grant or deny privileges is the ultimate "use" of peer review information obtained during the
credentialing process. If, as the dictionary definitions and case law suggest, "use" means "active
e~nploy~nent
o f ' or "carrying out a purpose by means of," it is broad enough to encompass
"decisions" made by using peer review information in the peer review process.
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It is not necessary for the statute to state that immunity shall he provided for "decisions to
grant or deny credentials" in order for it to encompass negligent credentialing claims. The
legislature could not anticipate and identify every lawsuit that might arise from the peer review
process. The Peer Review Act encompasses a wide variety of hospital activities. The statute
clearly covers not only retrospective disciplinary hearing -- "peer review" in the traditional sense
of the word -- but credentialing and privileging, "quality assul-ance and improvement, patient
safety investigations, patient adverse outcolne reviews, and root cause ai~alysisinvestigations."
I.C. $39-1392a. Given the scope of thc statute, it would be difficult to address all possible
claims that could arise from each kind of peer review activity. The answer to this dileinma is to
craft a general, but broad, immunity provision. The grant of immunity for "receiving" and "use"
of peer review informatioil accomplishes this goal.
"When a statute's language is broad enough to include a particular subject matter, an
intent to exclude it from the statute's operation must be specifically expressed." Idaho Home

Health, Inc, v. Bear Laice County, 128 Idaho 800, 802, 919 P.2d 329, 331 (1996). The Court
should not infer an intent to exclude negligent credentialing causes of action simply because the
iinniunity provisioris are worded generally and broadly. Breadth is not ambiguity.

D.

Enforcing the Statute According to its Plain Meaning Does Not Lead to
Absurd Results.

Harrison also suggests that providing immunity for negligent credentialing claims would
contradict the pu'pose of the Peer Review Act or lead to absurd results. This is not the case. In
Kazmlz,

supra, the Colorado Court of Appeals rejected the idea that granting imrnullity for
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negligent credentialing claims was inconsistent with the purpose of the Colorado peer review act.

Kaunlz at 817-19. The court observed that the statute would only bar claims where the hospital
actually conducted peer review prior to granting staff privileges, not claims where the hospital
failed to have a peer review process in place or failed to conduct peer review at all. Kauntz, 174
P.3d at 819. The same conclusion is true of Idaho's Peer Review Act. Immunity for "using"
infonnation can only exist if a hospital has a peer review process in place, and if it uses that
process prior to granting staff privileges to a physician.

Granting immunity ensures that

hospitals conduct peer review, because they can hardly claim immunity for causes of action
based on the "use" of peer review infonnation if they do not conduct peer review at a1L6
Further, the immunity provisions of I.C.

5

39-1392c do not distul-b a patient's ability to bring

traditional negligence lawsuits against doctors, or against hospitals for the negligence of their
employees.
The Kazlntz court also discussed a nunlber of other reasons why granting immunity for
negligent credentialing claims was co~lsistentwith the goal of peer review. Anlong these reasons
were that 1) it would encourage physicians to participate in peer review proceedings; 2)
negligence claims are likely to be reduced when the medical community polices its own conduct;
and 3) providing immunity would assure that the privileges remain intact. ICauntz, 174 P.3d at
817-19. The court stated, "it would be inconsistent to preclude a patient's discovery of peer

Harrisoli has not alleged that Saint Alphonsus failed to have a peer review process in place or that it failed to
conduct peer review prior to granting Dr. Hariford credentials. Rather, he asserted that the substantive decision to
in light of his history of alcohol and drug abuse. R. Vol. I, p. 126,n 40;
grant Dr. Hartcord credentials was ~~egligetit
Exhibit to R. K 15 a l p . 17.
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review documents dealing with an allegedly negligent physician, but still allow that patient's
negligent crcdentialing claim to be asserted. If such a claim were allowed, both patients and
hospitals would he at distinct disadvantages in proving their claims or defenses." Id. at 81 8. The
court ultimately concluded that, far from being an "absurd" result, immunity for negligent
credentialing claims was a rational, sensible ineans of furthering the goal of peer review.7
Providing immunity froin all kinds of lawsuits, including negligent credentialing claims,
is a rational means of achieving the objectives of the Peer Review Act. Public policy decisions
such as this are the business of the legislature. Xufing v. Ada County Paramedics, _-

P.3d -,

2008 WL 2357686 at * 3-4 (June l l , 2008)
E.

This Court has Already Limited the Scope of Judicial Review of the
Credentialing Decisions of Peer Review Committees.

In an analogous context, this Court has limited the scope of judicial review of a hospital's
decision to deny staff privileges. Miller v. Saint Alphonsus, 139 Idaho 825, 87 P.3d 934 (2004),
involved a lawsuit by a surgeon who was denied staff privileges at Saint Alphonsus. When the
surgeon applied for privileges, a number of doctors expressed reservations abont aspects of his
history that suggested an rnability to work harmoniously with other professionals.

Saint

Alphonsus conducted an in-depth, multi-step investigation regarding these concerns, and
ultimately denied the request for privileges. Id, 139 Idaho at 828, 87 P.3d at 937. This Court
7

Contrary to Harrison's suggestion, Saint Aiphonsus is not suggesting that immunity should somehow be inferred
from the existence of the peer review privileges. The immunity from negligent credeutialing claims comes frorn the
plain langilage of I.C. 5 39.1392~. For this reason, the cases Harris011 cites in which courts refused to llold that
negligent credeiltialing claims were abrogated by the existence of peer review privileges are inapposite. See, e.g, i n
i-e Zarrimore v. Vaughn Reg% /Wed C'nti,., l n c , 768 So.2d 374 (Alabama 2000); Greenwood v. CYierdsma, 741 P.2d
1079 (Wyoming 1987); Szm 1fefll1h Corp. v. Superior Corp., 70 P.3d 444 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2003). Here, there is no
occasion to "infer" that the Idaho legislature intended to bar negligent credentialing claims, because it did so
expressly.
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limited the scope of judicial review of the decision denying privileges lo a deter~ninationthat
there was an appropriate process in place to ensure that the doctor had received basic due process
protections. It refused to consider whether there was a sufficient basis for the decision. See id.,
139 Idaho at 832-835; 87 P.3d at 941-944.
While Miller did not involve a negligent credentialing claim by a patient, it stands for the
proposition that Idaho courts will not second-guess the substantive decisions of peer review
committees. While hospitals in Idaho must conduct peer review, including physician
credentialing, there is no provision of law that dictates precisely how this must be done or that in
any way circumscribes the substantive decision-making freedom of peer review committees.
I.C.

5 39-1392f provides:
Every hospital subject to this act shall cause the hospital's medical staff to
organize in-hospital medical staff coinmittees which shall have the
respotlsibility of reviewing the professional practices of members of the
hospital's medical staff for the purpose of reducing morbidity and
mortality, and for the improvement of the care of patients in the hospital.
This review shall include, but not be limited to, the quality and necessity
of care provided to patients.

The Idaho Administrative Code also contains a broad requirement that hospitals conduct peer
review prior to granting staff privileges. IDAPA 16.03.14.200.01.d & 16.02.14.250
Idaho Code

39-1395 provides that, subject to requirements that applicants for staff

privileges be afforded due process, hospitals retain full authority to set rules, standards, and
qualifications For ~nedicalstaff membership, and to @-antor refuse incdical staff me~nbershipas
they see fit. This statute provides in pertinent part:
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Except as otherwise provided in this section, no provision or provisions of
this section shall in any way change or modify the authority or power of
the governing body of any hospital to makc such rules, standards or
qualifications for medical staff membership as thcy, in their discretion,
may deem necessary or advisable, or to grant or refuse inembership on a
medical staff.

The process for considering applications for medical staff membership and
privileges shall afford each applicant due process.
These statutes, regulations, and this Court's interpretatiou of the law in Miller v. Saint
Alphonsus, demonstrate that while there is an obligation to conduct peer review according to a
process detennined appropriate by the hospital, courts will not second-guess decisions to grant or
deny credentials to a physician. Put colloquially, the message to hospitals is, "You are required
to conduct peer review, but how you do it is up Lo you. You have discretion to make decisions
about granting or denying hospital priviIeges as you see fit, and courts will not second-guess
these decisions in lawsuits alleging an improper grant or denial of credentials."

F.

Whether a Cause of Action for Negligent Credentialing Exists !Must Be
Decided in Light of Idaho's Unique Peer Review lmmur~ityProvisions.

1. Immunity, Not Common Law Duty, is the Issue.
It1 the trial court, liarrison relied upon cases from a nulnber of jurisdictions that have
imposed upon hospitals a colnmon law duty to take steps to verify the competence of physicians
seeking membership on their nledical staff. R. Vol. I, p. 178-182. However, the vast majority of
these cases did not discuss the issue of statutory immunity from negligent credentialing clain~s.
The trial judge conducted a painstaking review of the peer review statutes in every single state
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for which Harrison provided a citation, and concluded that they all varied markedly from Idaho's
unique statute. R. Vol I, p. 192-202. To summarize the trial judge's conclusions, some states
only provide immunity to physicians or individual peer review committee members, but not to
hospitals. Some states' peer review immunities only apply to claims brought by physicians, not
to claims brought by patients. Some statutory schemes do not consider credentialing activities to
be peer review, and some state peer review acts do not contain i~nmunityprovisions at all. Id.
Given the strictures of Idaho's unique act, immunity, not duty is the issue. The question

in this appeal is not whether hospitals "should" or "ought to" conduct peer review prior to
granting credentials. The legislature has already decided that such peer review is desirable. But
it has also determined that the best way to ensure that meaningful peer review occurs is to shield
the process, its participaxts, and its conclusions fi-om second-guessing in litigation. Stated
simply, there is a "duty," just not one that gives rise to a private tort claim
2. Cases Discussing the lmmu~xilyIssue are Informative, But Not
Controlling.

Saint Alphonsus is aware of only a handful of cascs that address whether state peer
review statutes provide immunity fron~negligent credentialing claims. The outcomes depend
entirely on the language of the particular peer review statute at issue. Taken together, these cases
stand for the proposition that where the statutory lanbmage is clear, peer review statutes can and
do provide imnlunity from negligent credentialing claims on the same basis that they provide
immunity against other causes of action
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The most recent case finding immunity is Kauntz, which has been discussed previously.
While the Colorado statute at issue there was not identical to Idaho's, there were some
similarities. Mainly, the operative grant of immunity was broadly worded, providing hospitals
with immunity for damages arising "in any civil action with respect to their participation in,
assistance to, or reporting of information to a professional review body in connection with a
professional review action." Kauntz, 174 P.3d at 8 17.
Peer review statutes in Texas and Ohio statutes also restrict clai~nsfor negligent
credentialiug. The Texas statute provides health care entities with immu~lityfrom claims arising
"from any act, statement, determination or recommendation made, or act reported, without
malice, in the course of peer review." See, Sl. Lulce's Episcopal Hospital v. Agbor, 952 S.W.2d
503, 505-507 (Texas 1997) (citing TEXASREV. CIV.STAT.ANN., art. 499%

5 5.06(1) & (m)). In

Agbov, the Texas Supreme Court refused to restrict the scope of this language or infer a

legislative intent to exempt negligent credentialing claims. Id.
Ohio has recently amended its peer review statute to specifically address negligent
credentialing clain~s, with the result that they are eliminated in all but the narrowest
circumstances. In Ohio, a hospital is now presumed not to be negligent if, at the time that it
credentialed the physician, it was accredited by the Joint Cornrnissioli on Accreditation of
Healthcare Organizations or another similar entity. Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2305,2Sl(B)(l).
Courts in Virginia, Georgia, Illinois, and Minnesota have declined to find immunity, as
did Ohio courts under ail older version of Ohio's peer review act. However, these courts were
considering statutes very different from Idaho's. In Stolllemyer v. Ghvamm, 60 Va. Cir. 474,
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2001 WL 34084307 (Virginia 2001), the court concluded that Virginia's statutory immunities
extended only to members of and consultants to peer review entities, and not to hospitals. Id. at
$4 (construing Va. Code Ann.

5

8.01-581.16). Browning v. Burt, 613 N.E.2d 993 (Ohio 1993)

declined to find itnmunity for similar reasons, holding that an older version of the Ohio statute
granted immunity to hospitals only where they participated as a member of a peer review
committee. Browning, 613 N.E.2d at 1006-1007. The former version of the Ohio statute also
provided that "[nlothing in this section shall relieve any individual or hospital from liability
arising from treatment of a patient." Id. In contrast, Idaho's statute clearly applies to "health
care organizations," and does not contain an exception for patient lawsuits. I.C.

39-1392~.

Further, the Ohio legislature has recently amended the peer review act to severely restrict the
scope of negligent credentialing c l a i ~ n s . ~
The Georgia Supreme Court has held that Georgia's peer review act does not provide
immunity from claims for negligent credentialing, but the basis of its holding was that
credentialing of doctors is not "peer review" under Georgia's act. See, McCall v. Henry Medical
Center, Inc., 551 S.E.2d 739, 742-43 (Georgia 2002) (construing OCGA $ 3 1-8-131(1)). 'The
Illinois statute at issue in fiigo v. Silver Cross Hospital and Medical Center, 876 N.E.2d 697
(Ill. App. Ct. 2007) contained an ar~wabiybroad grant of immunity, but also stated that
"[n]otlring in this Section shall relieve any individual or hospital from liability arising from
treatment of a patient." Id., 876 N.E.2d at 720, 315 111. Dec. 385, 408 (2007) (citing 210 ILCS
85J10.2). Idaho's statute does not contain such a limitation.
For this reason, the unpublished opinion in Phillip.~t i Burl, 1995 W L 353861 (Ohio App. 1995), which Harrison
claixns broadened the holding of Browning v. Burl, is no longer good law.
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Finally, in Larson v. Wasemiller, 738 N.W.2d 300 (Minn. 2007), the Minnesota Supreme
Court concluded that because the Minnesota pecr review act only provided immunity for actions
or recominendations based on "reasonable" beliefs fonned after "reasonable" efforts to ascertain
the facts, it could not complelely bar negligent crcdentialing claims. The court observed, "if the
legislature had intended to foreclose the possibility of a cause of action for negligent
credentialing, it would not have addressed the standard of care applicable to such an action." Id.
at 331. Idaho's statute contains no such language.
All of these cases -- whether they recognized or rejected immunity -- simply underscore
the fact that decisioils about immunity for negligent credentialing claims must be made in light
of the specific language of a particular state's pecr review act. In Idaho, the clear, unambiguous,
and broad grant of immunity against claims arisiug fvotn the "use" of peer review information
forecloses the possibility of a cause of actioii for negligent credentialing. The purpose of this
immunity is not to protect hospitals. It is to ensure, consistent with the goal of the Peer Review
Act, that the public receives the best possible liospiial care.
11.

THE COURT SHOULD DECLlNE TO REVIEW DISCOVERY ORDERS
THAT CONCERNED DR. EIARTFORD.
In the trial court, Harrison requested that Dr. Hartford produce certain medical records

that were submitted to the Idaho State Board of Medicine in connection with the disciplinary
hearings that took place in May of 2004. Dr. Hartford asserted, aucl the district court agreed, that
these were subject to the doctor-patient privilege aud that he had not waived the privilege by
submitting the records to the Board of Medicine. R. Vol. I, pp. 108-1 10. Saint Alphonsus
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respectfully submits that the Court should decline to address this issue. The discoverability of
Dr. Hartford's treatment records was an issue that arose between Harrison and Dr. Hartford, not
between Hamson and Saint Alphonsus. The district court dismissed all the claims against Dr.
Hartford with prejudice, pursuant lo the parties' stipulation. Saint Alphonsus is not in a position
to argue the merits of the district court's decision on the discoverability of Dr. Iiartford's
medical records, but il does believe that such issues should not be decided in his absence.

CONCLUSION
The plain language of the Idaho Peer Review Act's ilnnlunity provisions precludes a
cause of action arising out of the "use" of peer review information.

111 the context of

credentialing decisions, this means "using" peer review information to grant or deny privileges.
The statute, though broad, is not ambiguous, and providing immunity from negligent
credentialing clair~~s
furthers the purpose of encouraging robust peer review aud ensuring that the
process remains confidential. The decision of the district court should be affinned
DATED this

k
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day of August, 2008.
GJORDING & FOUSER, PLLC

V~ttorneys for Defendant-Respondent Saint
Alphonsus Regional Medical Center
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P.O. Box 829
Boise, ID 83701-0829

U.S. mail, postage prepaid
express mail
)L hand delivery
- facsimile

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF

U.S. mail, postage prepaid
express mail
- hand delivery
- facsimile
-

-

Page 24

APPENDIX ""A"

Askoxford. use

Page 1 of 2
VIE

HOME SHOP. EDUCATION. PRESS ROOM. CONTACT US.

ASK THE EXPERTS . BETTER WRITING . WORLD OF WORDS . GAMES .
GLOBAL ENGLISH. FOREIGN LANGUAGES

use
verb /yooz/ 1 take, hold, or deploy as a means of achieving
something. 2 (use up) consume or expend the whole of. 3
treat in a particular way. 4 exploit unfairly. 5 /yoost/ (used to)
did repeatedly or existed in the past. 6 lyoostl (belget used
to) be or become familiar with through experience. 7 informal
take (an illegal drug).

-used.nounthe/yooss/
1the action of using or the state of being
ability or power to exercise or manipulate

2
something: he lost the use of his legs. 3 a purpose for or way
in which something can be used. 4 value; advantage.

- PHRASES have n o use for.inforrnai dislike or be impatient
with. make use of use.
-ORIGIN

Old French user, from Latin uti.
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APPENDIX "C"

use - Definition from the Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary

: Main Entry:
/
:
/

/
1/

=Use ad

Pronunciation: \'yiiz\
Function: verb
Inflected Form(s): used
\'yiizd, in the phrase
"used to "usually Iyiis(t)\; ussing dx>\'yii-ziq\
Date: 14th century

i

transitive verb
I archaic : ACCUSTOM, HABITUATE
; 2 :to put into action or senrice : avail oneself
of: EMPLOY
3 : to consume or take (as liquor or drugs) regularly
4 : to carry out a purpose or action by means
of : UTILIZE; also : MANPU~LATE 2b <used him
i selfishly>
i 5 :to expend or consume by putting to use ---often
/ used with up
j 6 : to behave toward : act with regard to :TREAT
i <used the prisoners cruelly>
j 7 :%
m- Id <the house could use a coat of paina
! intransitive verb
j 1 -used in the past with to to indicate a former fact
i or state <we used to go more often><didnlt use to
smoke>
2 : to take illicit drugs regularly

:

:

:

I synonyms m,EMPLOY, UTILIZE mean to put

: into service especially to attain an end. implies
: availing oneself of something as a means or
i

instrument to a1 end <willing to use any means to
achieve her ends>. EMPLOY suggests the use of a
person or thing that is available but idle, inactive, or
disengaged <looking for better ways to employ their
skills>. UTILIZE may suggest the discovery of a
new, profitable, or practical use for something <an
old wooden bucket utilized as a planter>.

